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This paper provides empirical evidence 
about the determinants of the level of 
managerial compensation and of the structure 
of compensation within the management 
hierarchy. I establish the hypotheses relating 
the level of managerial pay and pay 
differentials between organizational levels to 
individual and firm characteristics suggested 
by the agency model and tournaments as a 
theory of managerial compensation. The 
characteristics emphasized in this article 
include the managerial position in the 
management hierarchy, ownership 
concentration of the firm, large shareholding, 
business risks, and the size and profitability of 
the firm. Hypotheses are tested 
cross-sectionally in ordinary least squares 
analysis using the data of 737 managers in 
171 Taiwan’s listed companies. Empirical 
results show that most of the predictions 
emerged in the theories of agency and 
tournaments gain support in the data. 
Although some of the individual findings are 
different from those presented in the literature 
using data from the United States, they ought 
to be seen as a result of the diverse enterprise 
culture and a reflection of a more 
entrepreneur-run corporate section in Taiwan.
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3文獻中有關經理人薪酬  (managerial 
compensation) 的研究，大多採用 Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) 的代理理論 (agency 
theory) 觀點，檢驗高階主管薪酬，尤指執















理層級 (management hierarchy) 之薪酬結
構的設計提出可驗證的實證觀點。

















































































































































































































































[5] Aggarwal, R. and A. Samwick (1999), The other side 
of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive 
compensation, Journal of Political Economy, 107, 65-105.
[6] Becker, B. and M. Huselid (1992), The incentive 
effects of tournament compensation systems, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 37, 336-350.
[7] Boyd, B.K. (1994), Board control and CEO 
compensation, Strategic Management Journal, 15, 335-344.
[8] Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L.H.P. Lang (2000), The 
separation of ownership and control in East Asian 
corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112.
[9] Conyon, M. and D. Leech (1994), Top pay, company 
performance and corporate governance, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 56, 229-247.
[10] Core, J., R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker (1999), 
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, 
and firm performance, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 15, 469-492.
[11] Cosh, A. and A. Hughes (1997), Executive 
remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional 
shareholdings, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 15, 371-492.
[12] Demsetz, H. (1995), Management compensation and 
tournament theory, in The economics of the business firm: 
seven critical commentaries, 110-136, Cambridge 
University Press.
[13] Ehrenberg, R. and M. Bognanno (1990), The incentive 
effects of tournaments revisited: Evidence from the 
European PGA tour, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
43, 74-88.
[14] Eriksson, T. (1999), Executive compensation and 
tournament theory: Empirical tests on Danish data, Journal 
of Labor Economics, 17, 262-280.
[15] Garen, J. (1994), Executive compensation and 
principal-agent theory, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 
1175-1199.
[16] Gregg, P., S. Machin, and S. Szymanski (1993), The 
disappearing relationship between directors’ pay and 
corporate performance, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 31, 1-9.
[17] Hallock, K.F. (1997), Reciprocally interlocking boards 
of directors and executive compensation, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32, 331-344.
[18] Holmstrom, B. (1979), Moral hazard and observability. 
Bell Journal of Economics, 10, Spring, 74-91.
[19] Holmstrom, B. (1987), Incentive compensation: 
Practical design from a theory point of view, in H.R. 
Nalbantian ed., Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Sharing, 
179-285, New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
[20] Janakiraman, S., R. Lambert, and D. Larcker (1992), 
An empirical investigation of the relative performance 
evaluation hypothesis, Journal of Accounting Research, 30, 
53-69.
[21] Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm: 
Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
[22] Jensen, M. and K. Murphy (1990), Performance pay 
and top management incentives, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, 225-264.
[23] Knoeber, C. and W. Thurman (1994), Testing the 
theory of tournaments: An empirical analysis of broiler 
production, Journal of Labor Economics, 12, 155-179.
[24] Lambert, R., D. Larcker, and K. Weigelt (1993), The 
structure of organizational incentives, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 38, 438-461. 
[25] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer 
(1999), Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of 
Finance, 54, 471-517.
[26] Lazear, E. (1989), Pay equality and industrial politics, 
Journal of Political Economy, 97, 561-580.
[27] Lazear, E. (1995), Personnel Economics, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
[28] Lazear, E. and S. Rosen (1981), Rank-order 
tournaments as optimum labor contracts, Journal of Political 
Economy, 89, 841-864.
[29] Leonard, J. (1990), Executive pay and firm 
performance, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 
13-29.
[30] Main, B. (1991), Top executive pay and performance, 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 12, 219-229.
[31] Main, B., C. III O’Reilly, and J. Wade (1993), Top 
executive pay: Tournament or teamwork?, Journal of Labor 
Economics, 11, 606-628.
[32] Mehran, R. (1995), Executive compensation, 
ownership, and firm performance, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 38, 163-184.
[33] Rosen, S. (1986), Prizes and incentives in elimination 





























































(1) (2) (3) (4)
常數項 13.5160a 13.6455a 13.5411a 13.7234a
(0.1603) (0.1816) (0.1745) (0.1983)
CH 0.5616a 0.5571a 0.5704a 0.5611a
(0.0571) (0.0569) (0.0535) (0.0532)
EXD 0.5845a 0.5755a 0.5897a 0.5743a
(0.0566) (0.0565) (0.0552) (0.0551)
VCH 0.3947a 0.4031a 0.3972a 0.3930a
(0.0926) (0.0896) (0.0919) (0.0894)
EX 0.2927a 0.2860a 0.2745a 0.2603a
(0.0888) (0.0879) (0.0884) (0.0878)
VEXD 0.2969a 0.2933a 0.2771a 0.2712a
(0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0554) (0.0553)
VEX 0.0488 0.0424 0.0468 0.0329
(0.0508) (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0521)
HI -1.2470a -4.3472a -1.4277a -6.9503a
(0.3070) (1.3464) (0.3794) (1.6214)
BLOCK -0.0027 0.0664 -0.0092 0.0659
(0.0419) (0.0570) (0.0473) (0.0656)
RETDUM -0.0674 -0.0743 -0.0743 -0.0739
(0.0599) (0.0605) (0.0621) (0.0614)
RETSE 0.0134 0.0387b 0.0164 0.0448b
(0.0104) (0.0171) (0.0105) (0.0182)
LNLABOR 0.1366a 0.1337a 0.1444a 0.1436a
(0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0221) (0.0221)
OI 1.4641a 1.4141a 1.4298a 1.3643a
(0.3578) (0.3518) (0.4100) (0.4038)
LNAGE -0.0233 -0.0689c -0.0435 -0.1064b











樣本數 737 737 607 607









(1) (2) (3) (4)
常數項 -7.7389a -7.8407a -7.1769a -7.2742a
(0.5138) (0.5450) (0.5394) (0.5676)
EXD -0.5424a -0.5400a -0.5386a -0.5353a
(0.0417) (0.0414) (0.0401) (0.0395)
VCH -0.3876a -0.3887a -0.3512a -0.3521a
(0.0859) (0.0861) (0.0853) (0.0841)
EX -0.2903a -0.2869a -0.2858a -0.2784a
(0.0796) (0.0800) (0.0774) (0.0783)
VEXD -0.2309a -0.2308a -0.2245a -0.2239a
(0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0405) (0.0401)
VEX 0.0006 0.0038 -0.0233 -0.0187
(0.0403) (0.0407) (0.0406) (0.0407)
LNPAYCH 0.5887a 0.5938a 0.5510a 0.5567a
(0.0340) (0.0349) (0.0361) (0.0368)
HI -0.0004 1.0441 0.0046 1.2961
(0.2244) (1.3694) (0.2757) (1.6203)
BLOCK 0.0476 0.0260 0.0711 0.0242
(0.0452) (0.0604) (0.0520) (0.0701)
RETDUM 0.0566 0.0580 0.0621 0.0664
(0.0529) (0.0541) (0.0543) (0.0543)
RETSE -0.0072 -0.0148 -0.0114 -0.0300
(0.0086) (0.0186) (0.0085) (0.0207)
LNLABOR -0.0895a -0.0903a -0.0975a -0.0993a
(0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0196)
OI -0.9209a -0.9209a -0.9117a -0.9135b
(0.3093) (0.3164) (0.3520) (0.3580)
LNAGE 0.0085 0.0212 0.0188 0.0355











樣本數 563 563 433 433









解釋變數 (1) (2) (3) (4)
常數項 13.3342a 13.5373a -3.3698a -3.1709a
(0.1699) (0.1868) (0.4548) (0.4678)
LEV1 0.9575a 0.9605a
(0.0626) (0.0613)
LEV2 0.6970a 0.7001a -0.7017a -0.7017a
(0.0622) (0.0610) (0.0465) (0.0468)
LEV3 0.4831a 0.4862a -0.4844a -0.4844a
(0.0614) (0.0602) (0.0466) (0.0469)
LEV4 0.3388a 0.3418a -0.3244a -0.3245a
(0.0622) (0.0609) (0.0474) (0.0476)
LEV5 0.1645b 0.1676b -0.1432a -0.1432b
(0.0687) (0.0674) (0.0576) (0.0579)
LNPAYMAX 0.3210b 0.3151a
(0.0312) (0.0312)
NOL2 -0.2925a -0.2886a 0.2574a 0.2407a
(0.1061) (0.1057) (0.0834) (0.0852)
NOL3 -0.1583a -0.1499a 0.1968a 0.1922a
(0.0506) (0.0502) (0.0368) (0.0373)
NOL4 -0.1268a -0.1375a 0.1221a 0.1176a
(0.0455) (0.0453) (0.0326) (0.0324)
NOL5 0.0233 0.0350 -0.0162 -0.0179
(0.0485) (0.0483) (0.0393) (0.0397)
HI -1.1228a -7.0344a -0.7863a -2.3738c
(0.3545) (1.1868) (0.2287) (1.2420)
BLOCK 0.0355 0.0958b -0.0241 -0.0630
(0.0360) (0.0475) (0.0290) (0.0419)
RETDUM -0.0265 -0.0130 0.0015 0.0105
(0.0618) (0.0619) (0.0495) (0.0495)
RETSE 0.0062 0.0252c -0.0011 -0.0180
(0.0103) (0.0148) (0.0074) (0.0125)
LNLABOR 0.1237a 0.1205a -0.0470a -0.0494a
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0156) (0.0157)
OI 1.5758a 1.5135a -1.2621a -1.3234a
(0.3616) (0.3570) (0.2872) (0.2923)
LNAGE -0.0102 -0.0768c -0.0574a -0.0738b







樣本數 724 724 553 553
調整後 R2 0.4331 0.4449 0.4839 0.4850
註：括弧內為經White估計式修正過之標準差；產業別與時間
別控制變數 ID1...ID8與 D97、D98的估計係數未顯示於表中；
a、b、c分別表示在 1%、5%、10%下顯著。
